2/11/23

A fine continuation of Churchill’s view of the Second World War. This book contains a close-up look at the difficulties faced by the average Brit…but does not discount the soldiers—both British and French, Australian, Canadian, Indian, and African. If you’ve read the first book, this is more in the same style. What’s different is some disclosures that surprised me for their not being mentioned in any of the other histories I’ve read.

Let me first provide an example of Churchill’s understated discussion of the French troop deployment against the initial German onslaught:

“One cannot be strong everywhere….[but] The spreading of forty-three divisions, of half the mobile French army, from Longwy to the Maginot Line forts….was an improvident disposition….A weight of opinion supports the criticism that the French reserves were inadequate, and, such as they were, badly distributed.”

He then goes on to discuss the weaknesses that the English should have pointed out, along with the anticipated, fairly strong, arguments in rebuttal by the French; and finally decides that the English should have made their case anyway. In other words, Churchill regrets that no one tried to point out that the French generals, left over from the First World War, were still trying to fight this war in the same way as before—without regard for the new developments in weaponry.

Without pulling punches, Churchill continues to describe the weaknesses of the French strategy and, after they entered the war, the Italian tactics (the which are too embarrassing to mention here). He notes that there seemed to be 2 types of French leaders responding to the German Blitzkrieg: the ones that decided that they’ve already lost the war and that everyone should just “give up”; and those that believed the British should give them more troops to continue the tactics that have lost the French so much ground already—in the belief that more of the same will finally win in the end.

And then there were the younger French generals…led by de Gaulle. One gets the impression that de Gaulle was a little bit too eager to use the British for all he could get and felt frustrated that the English put a higher priority on defending Great Britain than giving de Gaulle the extra support he needed to forge ahead.

Now here is something that quite surprised me:

In June of 1940 the British Cabinet and several French Ministers, including Generals, submitted to the French council of ministers a Declaration of Union wherein “The two Governments declare that France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union.” The idea being that the British could absorb the ships and armies of the defeated French regime and continue the fight against the Nazis under the resultingly more favorable conditions of military unity.

“The overwhelming feeling of the [French] Council was to reject the whole plan.” You’ll have to read the various reasons for rejection…the sheer stupidity and short-sidedness of the ministers is also too strained, and painful, for me to rehearse.

Meanwhile, the English flirted with some other, pretty strange, weapons, including dropping parachutes with suspended aerial mines to intercept German bombers, and 3 inch rocket torpedoes against enemy aircraft. And it is impressive that Churchill had the time/energy/forethought to contemplate: how to save the broken London windows in order to melt them down and reforge them into replacement windows; efforts to speed up the refilling of the bomb holes in the airfield runways; devising various camouflage for the soldiers; using civilians, rather than soldiers for much of the “grunt” work behind the scenes—to free up the soldiers for actual fighting.

This book ends with the defeat of the Italians and the capture of the Italian “empire” in Africa. And America has still not declared war on the Axis.

The degree to which Churchill was committed to overseeing the British war efforts is astounding and very impressive—he not only ran the country, as the Prime Minister, be he also ran the war, as the Minister of War. And he did both so well. ( )

'Their Finest Hour' indeed. A very close and detailed look at the events leading to the Battle Of Britain, the struggle itself and the very real impact of the 'Blitz' on civilians especially in London.
As in Volume 1 history unfolds on a detailed level with insights into the events and decisions of the day based on Churchill's minutes and orders (all done on paper at the time instead of just verbally).
Even though one knows the outcome, it is a gripping read. Seeing how many crucial junctions there were, where everything could have gone in a completely different direction. Especially Germany's strategic failure in their bombing campaign. ( )

Winston Churchill's six-volume history of the cataclysm that swept the world remains the definitive history of the Second World War. Lucid, dramatic, remarkable both for its breadth and sweep and for its sense of personal involvement, it is universally acknowledged as a magnificent reconstruction and is an enduring, compelling work that led to his being awarded the Nobel Prize for literature.

Their Finest Hour enthrallingly recounts key events and battles from May to December 1940 as Britain stood isolated while Nazi Germany pursued its seemingly unconquerable war path - the fall of France, Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain, the horrors of the Blitz and Hitler's plans to invade and crush Russia, his sole ally in Europe.

A narrator that does a great imitation of the great man. The history is well represented, from the faĺl of France to the blitzing of London and Great Britain, gives the listener a ring-side seat. ( )