Whatever minute admiration I had for Woodrow Wilson has been erased by Mr. Herman's account of 1917, and it brings into sharper focus the danger we face today. Our leaders are equally as arrogant as Wilson and like Lenin seem immune to human suffering. ( )

Arthur Herman’s 1917 was published this year in observation of the 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution and of significant developments in World War I. The unifying theme of the book is to contrast the actions and characters of the two most influential persons on the world stage that year—Woodrow Wilson, president of the U.S. from March, 1913 to March, 1921, and Vladimir Lenin, who served as head of government of Soviet Russia from 1917 to 1924 and of the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1924.

The author states that one mission of the book is to show how “these two intellectuals and dreamers” managed to overthrow traditional geopolitics and alter the distribution of world power. For Wilson’s part, he got Congress to declare war on Germany in spite of his campaign promises to keep the country out of war. After the war was over, Wilson’s words stimulated nationalist quests around the world, much to the Allies’ chagrin, and to the benefit of Lenin, as will be explained below.

Lenin successfully established the world’s first one party state dictatorship which he imposed on a vast and diverse country on the basis of an ideology some historians have, to account for its success, likened to a religious cult. Certainly the Soviets adapted some of the tropes of religion (Lenin loves the little children!) to push their agenda.

Perhaps more importantly, Herman avers, the age was “shaped as much by what Lenin and Wilson aimed and failed to do as by what they succeeded in doing.” Both worked for a new world order, and both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were indeed changed radically, but not in the directions either of them intended or foresaw.

Two (only somewhat) lesser players in Herman’s drama are Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Alexander Kerensky, the principal rivals of, respectively, Wilson and Lenin. Herman contrasts the hard headed, realistic approaches of Lodge and Kerensky with the more theoretical and utopian approaches of Wilson and Lenin. But while Lodge, through his influence in Congress, prevailed in curtailing Wilson’s agenda, Kerensky was pushed aside by Lenin, who succeeded in overthrowing Kerensky and his democratic government.

Ironically, Wilson was on the winning side of the war, yet he failed to achieve his long term goals of setting up an effective multinational agency to maintain the peace. Lenin, on the other hand, not only overturned a long ruling monarchy, but successfully set in motion the entrenchment of a completely new kind of state. Herman attributes Lenin’s relative (compared to Wilson’s) success to his extreme ruthlessness and willingness to use “revolutionary violence” to achieve his ends. Herman might also have mentioned the very different natures of the polities each man strove to direct. Lenin, in a way, had more “freedom” to exercise his will in his non-free society than Wilson did in his democracy with the shared power of different branches of government.

It is also relevant to Herman’s theme to note the observations of historian David Reynolds, the author of in The Long Shadow: The Legacies of the Great War in the Twentieth Century. Reynolds points out that after the war, Wilson not only did not make himself any friends abroad, but unwittingly aided the cause of Lenin and communism. By lecturing Europe on the need for “self-determination” of minorities, Wilson roiled up anti-colonial agitators and alienated most of the other world leaders. They scoffed at Wilson for his hypocrisy and excoriated him for not understanding the effects “his seductive words would set in motion.” In response to the hostility of the Allied leadership against Wilson for stirring up trouble without knowing what he was talking about, Wilson not only backed down, stating that he had spoken “without the knowledge that nationalities existed….” but acquiesced in the imperialist policies of his allies. That precipitated a backlash against Wilson throughout the world outside America by the people as well as their leaders, with disillusioned nationalists turning to communism. Reynolds argues, “Right across the colonial world, in fact, Leninism gained from Wilson’s shattered credibility.”

Evaluation: 1917 was certainly a pivotal year in history, with the legacy of both Wilson and Lenin affecting the political climate long after they left the world scene. Herman’s account provides an interesting way to frame some of the most important events that shaped the 20th century.

(JAB) ( )