Norman Friedman (1) (1946–)

Though I always take Norman Friedman's books on warships seriously, almost without question, I do regard his other works a little more critically going in, as he tends to do a bit better with the particular detail than the general trend. Also, there is the matter that a library of books have been written about warplanes of the USN, so the question becomes what does Friedman bring to the table that's new. The answer is that this is really a book about the evolution of the USN's doctrine of air warfare, the maintenance of force levels, and the business of what ordnance to throw at the enemy, and how; filling up the interstices between that raft of existing type histories. I thought that this was great stuff, but Friedman was most illuminating about the early days of the process (Friedman ends with the F-35), as the USN asked itself the basic questions about how to deliver a torpedo by air on one hand, and how much its aircraft could be multi-purpose on the other.

As for whether you need this book, well, certain people who are very hard-core aircraft historians, or have a professional interest, probably do. However, at a list price of $100.00 I was happy to get it out of a library first. Also, I would note that while this book is described as hard-bound, that binding is cardboard with glued-on cover art; but it was produced in America so that counts for something I suppose (probably a commentary on collapsing supply chains).… (mere)

What one has here is essentially two books. The first 2/5s takes you up to the battle of Okinawa, as the Big Three carrier navies tried to perfect area defense against a mass air attack. The back 3/5s deals with Okinawa, the Japanese "special attack" campaign, and the horrified discovery of the U.S. Navy that its systems were not really adequate to deal with an all-directions saturation air assault. From there, the rest of the book takes you up to the end of the Cold War, as the USN (and to a lesser degree the RN), tried to cope with this problem, with varying degrees of success. I would also note that the post-WWII portion of this work is really dense, and it's difficult to assimilate in one pass; though the reality that the F-14 Tomcat was not all its good press made it out to be was a major takeaway for me.

The question then becomes, since this is really a reference book (I managed to get an inter-library loan), is whether it's worthy of acquisition before it becomes a really expensive collector's item. On the whole, the answer is probably yes.… (mere)

At this late date I'm not sure there's much more to be said about Norman Friedman's contributions to the study of naval history and defense policy, as it's one sustained career of excellence. As for this work, like Friedman's other studies related to the Royal Navy, there is the consideration of the constant tension between constrained resources, technological change, and strategic demands. If there is one trend that has come to be understated, it's how, until the rise of nuclear power, there was a sense that so-called "High Test Peroxide" would be the fuel of the future for submarines. Another trend is the chronic misunderstanding of the Soviet strategic agenda, and the means the Soviet state could deploy to attain those ends. Finally, there is a consideration of the hollowing out which post-Thatcher economic ideology has subjected the British military posture to, whether this ideology made sense or not. Highly recommended.… (mere)