A quick but well documented book that takes advantage of newly(1992) released info from Aust military archives and Japanese resources to review the Battle of Savo Island. Takes issue with Morison blaming RAAF recon flight failure to send sighting message by documenting receipt in several places including by the Japanese ships being reported. Refutes Fletcher's run to safety because his ships needed fuel by revealing from logs that the carriers had at least 3 days. Supports other sources that identify that K Turner was willing at Guadalcanal and later at Saipan to bail out with his ships and leave the landing forces unsupported by materiel and reinforcements, Suggest that the early books and reports were less a coverup for the admirals than a need to demonstrate that allies could work together, Low opinions by allied leadership for the quality of Japanese Navy training and night figting ca/pabilities as well as really fouled up communication and command decisions were the more likely reasons for the this early Pacific naval disaster. ( )