A good psychological book about battle command, weak statistics

This book is a classic in military history — one of the most popular analyses of morale in the US WW2 soldier. Unfortunately some of the main statistics in the book (primarily that only 10-25% of soldiers fire their weapons in combat) were probably never true, and are definitely not true with current training systems, but the rest of the book’s insights about the psychology of both commanders and the commanded remain true.

It was interesting to me just how different WW2-style war is from the “low intensity conflict” I’ve seen up close — primarily in an urban environment, sustained for years, and without decisive force or the same kind of clear territorial objectives. While both kinds of war are terrible, I hope we never see total war of the WW2 style again.

Some of the insights from this book seem applicable to civilian leadership, but it probably isn’t a particularly good resource for that, being both very dated and kind of specific to a certain kind of challenge (even if it weren’t military). ( )

This book was an analysis of the behaviour of American soldiers under combat conditions. The third printing, the one I read, had been revised after the Korean conflict, as some of Brigadier Marshall's theories had been field tested since the original edition of 1947. The book is essential to the study of the military art in the twentieth century, and should be followed by a reading of Col. David Grossman's books "On Killing" and "On Combat". ( )

This was a little dry, but the subject matter was interesting. Ended on a note which is still very applicable today as our country transitions from two wars - that we need to cultivate a civilian population that would be willing to defend our country or in a few years we will face the consequences. Definitely a worthwhile read. ( )