During the four years that the United States participated in the Second World War, three figures came to personify for the American people the enemy nations that comprised the Axis powers. Two of them, the German dictator Adolf Hitler and the Italian leader Benito Mussolini, were understandable choices that reflected the dominance both leaders enjoyed in their respective political systems. Yet the third figure, Hideki Tojo, was arguably a more questionable choice. Though he served as prime minister of Japan from October 1941 until July 1944, he was, to borrow the analogy from a foreign correspondent cited in Alvin Coox's short and efficient biography of the man, a bee in a hive of the militaristic leadership that drove Japan to war and led it to defeat.

One of the merits of Coox's book is the expertise he brings to navigating the complexities of army politics, a necessity considering the amount of Tojo's life he spent within it. The son of an army officer, as a young man he rose through the ranks by dint of his hard work. By 1933 he was appointed a major general and was soon drawn into national politics. Here Coox illuminates the fraught and often deadly nature of Japanese politics during this period, which saw extremist army officers taking it upon themselves to assassinate politicians and even plot the overthrow of the cabinet in an effort to move policy in a direction to their liking. Coox places Tojo within the ranks of the Tosei Ha, or Control Faction, which, while staunchly conservative, was comparatively more moderate than the extremist Kodo Ha, or Imperial Way Faction.

During this period Tojo thrived in a number of positions, acquiring the experience as well as many of the approaches he would employ once he became prime minister. Foremost among them was his use of "MP politics," a habit he picked up after serving as commander of the Kempei gendarmerie in Manchuria. Coox sees his time in Manchuria as particularly critical in forming his approach towards government, which was based more on command than on building a consensus. Nearly as important was his appointment as war minister in 1940, his service in which paved the way for his appointment as prime minister the following year. These offices put him at the heart of the decision-making process that led Japan to attack the United States in December 1941, one that Coox describes in detail to show the degree to which it reflected a consensus among all of the major political figures, not just Tojo.

In the immediate aftermath of bombing of Pearl Harbor Tojo enjoyed a period of euphoria as Japan won victory after victory. As the tide turned against the empire, though, Tojo championed ever greater commitment and discipline as the means of attaining victory. With the fall of Saipan in July 1944 many officers concluded that victory was no longer possible, yet Tojo continued to stress the greater importance of values in a war increasingly driven by technology. Within weeks of Japan's defeat Tojo was identified as a war criminal and arrested after a failed suicide attempt, leaving him to face the international military tribunal that ordered his execution in 1948.

Given the prominence of the war in the modern imagination, it is surprising that there are so few books about a leader who was such an important figure during it. This has the effect of increasing the value of Coox's book. As a longtime scholar of Japanese military history, he employs his considerable expertise to explaining the factors in Tojo's rise and the role he played in bringing his country into the most devastating war it ever faced. Though over forty years old, it still retains its value as an introduction to the most obscure of the Axis leaders and is the first book that English-language readers interested in learning about the man should seek out. ( )