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The Feeling of Life Itself: Why Consciousness Is Widespread but Can't Be Computed (The MIT Press)

af Christof Koch

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An argument that consciousness, more widespread than previously assumed, is the feeling of being alive, not a type of computation or a clever hack.In The Feeling of Life Itself, Christof Koch offers a straightforward definition of consciousness as any subjective experience, from the most mundane to the most exalted--the feeling of being alive. Psychologists study which cognitive operations underpin a given conscious perception. Neuroscientists track the neural correlates of consciousness in the brain, the organ of the mind. But why the brain and not, say, the liver? How can the brain, three pounds of highly excitable matter, a piece of furniture in the universe, subject to the same laws of physics as any other piece, give rise to subjective experience? Koch argues that what is needed to answer these questions is a quantitative theory that starts with experience and proceeds to the brain. In The Feeling of Life Itself, Koch outlines such a theory, based on integrated information.Koch describes how the theory explains many facts about the neurology of consciousness and how it has been used to build a clinically useful consciousness meter. The theory predicts that many, and perhaps all, animals experience the sights and sounds of life; consciousness is much more widespread than conventionally assumed. Contrary to received wisdom, however, Koch argues that programmable computers will not have consciousness. Even a perfect software model of the brain is not conscious. Its simulation is fake consciousness. Consciousness is not a special type of computation--it is not a clever hack. Consciousness is about being.… (mere)
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I heard about this book from an interview with Koch on the excellent Brain Science Podcast and was intrigued to understand more about IIT (Integrated Information Theory).

I found the book to be easy to read and with some good attempts to explain the core concepts of IIT, which in turns out is less about the information content of thought and more about the causal structure of the system being the source of consciousness.

I quite liked how Koch progressed from some key features of subjective experience, to the core theory, to implications in terms of consciousness in humans, other animals, computers and the universe generally. He thinks computers are a long way off having enough connectivity or subtlety of signalling to have any consciousness, though this is not to be ruled out if they get better at replicating neuronal function.
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  paulusm | Aug 12, 2021 |
Philosophers write some excellent books on consciousness (recent examples: Philip Goff, Susan Schneider), but we need some from neuroscientists like Christof Koch too. This one splendidly fills the bill, addressing the subject from the perspective of the physics-like Integrated Information Theory (IIT), where "information" (symbol: Phi) has neither its everyday nor its Shannon meaning but rather means what can be paraphrased as "maximally irreducible cause-effect power". Even though it avoids mathematical formalism and is only 12 pages long, the central eighth chapter, which has the important job of explaining some of IIT's details, is conceptually very challenging (and it does seem to renege on a promise to calculate Phi's numerical value for the simple logic circuit used as an example). Fortunately, it does not barricade the reader from reaping the riches of the later chapters. Among these riches: consciousness ("being") is distinctly different from intelligence ("doing"); likening brains (many feedback connections) to computers of the conventional kind (mostly feedforward connections) is deeply erroneous; the kind of mind upload created by copying a brain's connectome to the computational "cloud" would not only fail to preserve personal identity but also completely fail to be conscious; IIT has considerable compatibility with panpsychism.
  fpagan | May 19, 2020 |
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An argument that consciousness, more widespread than previously assumed, is the feeling of being alive, not a type of computation or a clever hack.In The Feeling of Life Itself, Christof Koch offers a straightforward definition of consciousness as any subjective experience, from the most mundane to the most exalted--the feeling of being alive. Psychologists study which cognitive operations underpin a given conscious perception. Neuroscientists track the neural correlates of consciousness in the brain, the organ of the mind. But why the brain and not, say, the liver? How can the brain, three pounds of highly excitable matter, a piece of furniture in the universe, subject to the same laws of physics as any other piece, give rise to subjective experience? Koch argues that what is needed to answer these questions is a quantitative theory that starts with experience and proceeds to the brain. In The Feeling of Life Itself, Koch outlines such a theory, based on integrated information.Koch describes how the theory explains many facts about the neurology of consciousness and how it has been used to build a clinically useful consciousness meter. The theory predicts that many, and perhaps all, animals experience the sights and sounds of life; consciousness is much more widespread than conventionally assumed. Contrary to received wisdom, however, Koch argues that programmable computers will not have consciousness. Even a perfect software model of the brain is not conscious. Its simulation is fake consciousness. Consciousness is not a special type of computation--it is not a clever hack. Consciousness is about being.

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