Michael E. Weaver

This study represents a critique of the National Guard and the United States Army as the forces of "nationalization, consolidation and rationalization" erased the distinctions between the National Guard and the Regular Army so only a total force remained. The emphasis is on just what it took to turn a collection of units that functioned mostly as local social clubs into a real combat formation; a process that had to essentially be repeated several times due to the stresses of first creating a large enough army to take the field and then coping with the erosion of the unit due to the wear and tear of battle. The compelling contrast that shows the process worked is between the the battles of Hurtgen Forest and the Ardennes, where after almost being ground into powder by the bad generalship of Courtney Hodges in the former campaign the 28th (though still very fragile) fought a great delaying action and arguably contributed out of all proportion to stopping the German offensive; Weaver noting that the men of the "Bloody Bucket" knew the difference between a fight being fought for its own sake and a fight that had to be contested to the hilt. This all becomes part of a consideration of how much volition means in terms of unit coherence.… (mere)