Thomas C. Hone

The Pacific War is a well-trod field of study covered by historians almost too many to count. These accounts run the gamut from straight up recitations of battles lost and won to technological studies pitting Zero versus Wildcat and Yamato versus Missouri. There are many biographies that study the leaders and significant personalities of the war that may touch on relationships between these individuals. However, "Mastering the Art of Command" takes these conventional historical studies to a different level in examining the actions of one man, Chester W. Nimitz, across the four years of the Pacific War.

Trent Hone is a well-known and prolific historian with a number of works concerning the early 20th Century U.S. Navy to his credit, so he is well qualified to pen this work. Published in 2022 by the U.S. Naval Institute Press, "Mastering the Art of Command" has 430 pages, laid out with an introduction, prologue, ten numbered chapters, a conclusion, endnotes, and an index. The book is presented in chronological order--the only way this study could succeed. Chapter 1 starts with Nimitz's assumption of command of the decimated U.S. Pacific Fleet a mere three weeks after Pearl Harbor. Chapter 2 shows Nimitz working mightily to gain the trust of his boss, the newly designated Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet and soon to be Chief of Naval Operations Ernest J. King, if only to buy enough time to gain some success with his new command. Chapter 3 discusses the Battle of Midway, a near-run thing for Nimitz not only with the Imperial Japanese Navy but also with his own chain of command to gain the freedom to architect this tremendous victory. Chapter 4 shows Nimitz transitioning to the offensive in the Guadalcanal campaign, while Chapter 6 illustrates the changes Nimitz had to adopt in personnel, organization, and tactics in the midst of the lengthy Guadalcanal struggle.

Chapter 6 covers developments in the Pacific through 1943, a time when Nimitz's forces were absorbing new equipment, ships, and personnel in preparation for the coming Central Pacific campaign. Hone also discusses the organizational changes initiated by Nimitz in preparation for the next phase of Pacific Fleet operations. Chapter 7 charts the progress of the offensive in its initial battles, beginning with the Gilberts campaign in November 1943. Chapter 8 picks up the story in mid-1944 as the Joint Chiefs, Admiral King, and Nimitz's own CINCPOA staff planned operations for the rest of the year. Nimitz's intent was to keep the pressure on the Japanese, in some cases by increasing the pace of operations and bypassing more fortified objectives if possible. Chapter 9 takes the story through the two major invasions of early 1945, the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. At the same time Nimitz had to find a way to coordinate actions with the mercurial Douglas MacArthur as well as begin the planning process for an invasion of the Japanese home islands. Chapter 10 finishes the war, covering the changing command relationships between Nimitz and MacArthur as a precursor for Operation Olympic, the proposed invasion of Kyushu. Hone's concluding chapter provides an overall assessment of Chester Nimitz, to include a brief look at his tenure as Chief of Naval Operations after the war. Interestingly, while Hone considers Nimitz one of the most successful commanders in the Second World War, those characteristics that made him successful in war failed him in the postwar political battles facing the Navy in the late 1940's.

This is a remarkable effort by Hone. In his introduction, the author introduces modern leadership and management concepts that he develops and retroactively applies in the following chapters to Chester Nimitz. While Nimitz was a product of early 20th Century U.S. Navy officer training, much of what he brought to the table came from his own personality and intelligence. Hone also does an excellent job comparing and contrasting Nimitz with his peers like King, MacArthur, Halsey, Spruance, Ghormley, Kincaid, Theobold, and others, all of which show how Nimitz's unique character affected his relationships with these figures to engineer success in war.

This is definitely a must read for students of the Pacific War.… (mere)

An excellent book about a man who was likely WW2's best admiral. Like George Marshall, Chester Nimitz never commanded a battle but successfully waged a war. Early to recognize that Naval Academy grads steeped in tradition did not guarantee their success at sea. He developed his operational skill set requirements and staffed accordingly. Two of his best choices, Halsey and Spruance were very successful but for quite different reasons. The irony was that Halsey, like MacArthur*, got his fifth star and Spruance did not. Halsey was lucky that the tin cans and jeep carriers saved his bacon and reputation at Leyte Gulf.

Hone's book should be read as a preamble to any WW2 course on the Pacific Campaign and then again as a summary and discussion guide at the conclusion.

* MacArthur also received the Medal of Honor for being the nonhero of Corregidor… (mere)

This is a very different take on the force that the United States Navy took into World War II, as the author treats the service as a "Complex Adaptive System," and examines the ways from 1900-1940 it assimilated modern technology, with the ultimate climax being the creation of the "Combat Information Center," where all incoming information could be pulled together to allow a commander to come to an accurate appraisal of the combat environment, and act accordingly. This monograph ends on the note that the rapid build-up and standardization of the USN from 1943 on basically truncated the service's ability to function as a learning system, though only once the necessary lessons had been learned. The hanging question is whether the current U.S. Navy, faced with a new opponent (the PRC) determined to exploit its liabilities and weaknesses, can again learn, improvise, and innovate.… (mere)