Benjamin M. Friedman

The basic argument in this book appears to be that periods of good economic growth overlap with relatively benign social and foreign policy. The author goes to great lengths to correlate periods of economic growth with the social-political responses in various regions and countries. While the hypothesis sounds sensible, it does not provide for counter-intuitive or vicious circles of stimulus and response (cause and effect). Since the author is apparently already highly committed to his theory, he tends to bring up examples that support his thesis, while glossing over inconsitencies as random exceptions. The most cited example of his thesis is, of course, the way post-World War I Germany was pushed into dictatorship and mass genocide by the harshness of the war reparations; or so the popular perception goes. This begs the question of the personal culpability of the individual leaders and demogogues like Hitler. The thesis is that certain economic conditions will necessarily throw up such political forces, leading to a less liberal and tolerant regime.
We can, however, think of mainstream examples that seem to portray the opposite of the thesis. For instance, it was as a response to the suffering of the Great Depression in the 1930s that the New Deal and the welfare state was thought up in America. It was as a reaction to the excesses of authoritarian rule that the welfare state was conjured in the post-World War II period. On the other hand, period of continuous growth and prosperity may lead to increasin belligerancy and hubris and the military state, as is the popular perception, for instance, of the resurgent Chinese state, or even of the rise of more authoritarian, less tolerant regimes in many democracies across the world. The book serves as a valable record of the economic and social record of the post-War world; it would, perhaaps, have read better were it not hobbled by the author's pre-conceived theory.… (mere)

The first quarter of the book outlines some of the intellectual ideas, largely generated by theologians, arising from moral philosophy (in a distinctly Western and Christian view) that slowly developed to form a foundation for Adam Smith, himself a professor of moral philosophy, to write The Wealth of Nations. Over the next quarter of the book, the author shows the rather rapid move from moral philosophy to political economy and the continuing religious and moral underpinnings in the development of economic thought. Unfortunately, the understanding of theology and the Bible in their influence on the development of capitalism is breezy, sometimes misleading, and too often presents debatable content as facts. The latter half of the books focuses exclusively on the United States and the development of economics as a unique discipline. The first half of this half discusses the contending development of the Gospel of Wealth and the Social Gospel, largely premillennialism versus postmillennialism; but by the advent of World War I, the author's focus blurs and begins to shift from economics (capitalism disappears from the text and largely been accepted as the point of economics, at least in the US and Europe) to religion and politics, with economics serving as a catalyst. This last quarter of the book does not seem to relate much to anything that came before -- it feels tacked on to cater to the politics of the moment -- and focuses almost exclusively on fundamentalist Protestantism and its conservative influence on government economic policy. While I enjoyed portions of the book, and will likely investigate some of the titles included in the bibliography, I was frustrated. There is little about capitalism's spread across other continents as an agent of imperialism and Christianity and the subsequent encounter with other religious and moral foundations that influenced how capitalism was accepted and developed. Or even capitalism's strange success in the controlled economy of authoritarian China (not really a form of communism except in the name of the political party) or religion's inability to address social issues as expected except through government (e.g., the failure of prohibition). And, as is true with most books that try to end with the most recent study or data, a study that came out after this book was published notes "a dramatic rise of various kinds of non-religion in the US." (see David E. Campbell, Geoffrey C. Layman, and John C. Green, Secular Surge: A New Fault Line in American Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2021.)… (mere)

Attempts to demonstrate that economic growth leads to morally-favourable outcomes for society. Does so in part by defining 'moral consequences' in a way that makes them increasingly synonymous with 'economic growth' - making his argument somewhat tautological.

The rest of Friedman's claims hinge on correlation not causation, and the book is appended with a chapter entitled 'Great Depression, Great Exception' - which acknowledges that the largest period of economic regression in modern history does not follow his model.

Nevertheless - well-written, detailed and thorough, if a little uninspiring at times.… (mere)