David M. Glantz

Excellent book on airborne operations in Soviet Union before, during and after WW2.

Author gives a historical overview of the establishment of airborne units in Soviet Union in the 1930's and the way Stalin's purge caused deficit of qualified senior officers (general staff level, operations fought valiantly in any instance) that could have prevented misuse of these forces during the battles with Germans. Using very detailed references from both Soviet and German side it is visible that Germans were affected by paratrooper actions but due to lacking materiel means overall effect was piecemeal drops and attacks that were more convenient for Germans to counter, although these did tie substantial resources in the Germany's rear area and thus affected the front operations.

I have to admit it was quite a surprise to read about very intensive use of airborne forces from the Soviet side (considering their preference using infantry and motorized forces supported by high number of artillery pieces). Considering they used both planes and gliders I have to admit I was very much surprised.

Author gives a very detailed presentation of strategic level disasters (like Vyazma assault) caused by the lack of experience but also technical means to deploy huge number of paratroopers in a short time period to a designated area. This would continue to be a hallmark of Soviet airborne deployments whenever strategic effect was attempted (even as operational experience grew, material support was way lagging, especially in means of transport). Use of light armed infantry behind enemy lines did cause issues for German army but not as expected by Soviet command. Due to this smaller, tactical and special operation drops were the mainstay of the Soviet airborne forces and these were much more effective and successful. Coupled with partisan units airborne troops proved to be a force multiplier.

Also, author gave very interesting information on post-WW2 evolution of the now fully operational VDV and the way they adopted first to the nuclear warfare tactics and then to full adoption of helicopters in the vertical maneuver.

Excellent book, highly recommended to military history buffs.… (mere)

Much of what I thought about the companion book in this duo also applies here, though, for whatever reasons, this volume feels more like a narrative and less like a collection of footnotes and appendices lightly tied together. One particular thought that comes to mind is that the most significant Soviet military personality to come out of this operation was Andrei Grechko, who went on to become Soviet defense minister. One of his particular contributions to operational thought is that, apparently, he intended to use tactical nuclear weapons early and often had there been a war with NATO. Perhaps a reaction to how the Soviet offensive to drive Army Group South out of the Caucasus could never quite attain the great encirclement that was desired.… (mere)